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Abstract 
Recently there has been a renewed interest in Demand Responsive Transport (DRT) and 
related service offerings as a system that can serve 21st century patterns of dispersed low-
density travel. Numerous attempts have been made to introduce forms of DRT, but despite 
some limited applications, DRT has largely stalled amidst technological, regulatory, and 
economic barriers.  
Significantly, the impetus for DRT is now from technology-led companies that have already 
impacted upon taxi operations and have ambitions to develop their products and markets 
taking them into mainstream public transport, and some more innovative UK authorities are 
developing partnerships with these new digital technology operators. This has been 
accelerated by the pandemic creating uncertainty about how public transport use will change, 
coupled with local authorities seeking economic and social recovery amidst financial pressures 
on public transport support.   
This paper reports some results from an in-depth case study of one city’s radical shift towards 
replacing conventional bus routes with DRT. This is the partnership between the commercial 
DRT operator, Via, and Milton Keynes Council. In autumn 2020 an area served by one Council 
supported bus route was converted to DRT and from April 2021 eleven other supported routes 
in Milton Keynes were replaced with DRT, run by Via and largely operated using electric 
vehicles. With a growing fleet of 26 vehicles covering the whole of Milton Keynes Borough, 
this represents the most widespread urban DRT application in the UK.  
This paper draws on documentary evidence, operational data and in-depth interviews with key 
stakeholders, focussing on the operational, business and policy aspects of the system and 
how it may develop. Key public policy issues are identified in the cost-effective use of DRT, 
user adaptations and understandings needed, the partners and expertise required, and 
practices and relationships needed between actors for DRT to have a socially transformative 
effect on how public transport is provided and is used. 
Introduction 
Despite various government initiatives, bus passenger numbers in Britain have been steadily 
declining. In the ten years from 2009/10 to 2019/20, bus patronage fell by 13.5% from 5.2 
billion in to 4.5 billion with a 10.5% decline in revenue (DfT, 2020). This was even before the 
impact of the extended lockdowns due to Covid-19 from May 2020 when bus passenger 
numbers dropped to 15% of pre-pandemic levels in London and 10% elsewhere (DfT, 2021). 
By the end of May 2021, passenger numbers had returned to about 75% of pre-pandemic 
levels both in London and elsewhere, but the sector expects to recover only around 80% of 
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pre-pandemic journeys, whilst new modes such as Uber and e-scooters pose further long-
term existential challenges. Outside of major urban areas, there is the possibility that within a 
decade buses could become largely irrelevant. Behind the decline in bus use is a core long-
term structural problem of the scheduled bus service model. Fixed routes and schedules 
operate well along high density travel corridors, but, as noted in the report All Change? 
(Marsden et al., 2018), the major areas of travel growth are now for social and leisure-related 
purposes. Geographically, the strongest growth has not been along major corridors into 
city/town centres but in cross-suburban, urban fringe (‘peri-urban’) and in rural areas (Hall, 
2013). The nature of our urban environments has changed and consequently so too has our 
mobility behaviour.  
The local bus model of scheduled corridor services has become increasingly unable to 
accommodate this long-term shift in the socio-technical landscape (Potter et al 2021). 
Consequently, bus services have come to concentrate on markets that conform to their 
operating model, with a particular emphasis on commuting (which makes up 44% of bus trips 
compared to 15% of all trips) and shopping journeys, both of which are in decline - a decline 
that the pandemic appears to have accelerated.  
The medium-term effects of the pandemic shock on top of already declining bus use are only 
just beginning to emerge. During the pandemic, special support for bus services were put in 
place (the COVID-19 Bus Services Support Grant and the Bus Service Operators Grant, DfT 
2021a), but as these come to an end, bus operators are facing a more difficult business 
landscape. One consequence is that local authorities are anticipating a resultant increase in 
financial demands as some commercial bus services in their areas cease to be economically 
viable and a rise in subsidies are needed for their own supported services. Even before the 
pandemic, local authorities were facing difficulties in financing essential bus services (LGA 
2018), and with post-pandemic public finance cuts in prospect, funds to support buses are set 
to be cut even further. This comes just as the economic impact of the pandemic results in 
many people needing to find new employment and make other adjustments to their travel 
behaviour.  
In the middle of the 2021 lockdown, the government announced the new National Bus Strategy 
(DfT 2021a), which looks to local authorities entering into proactive partnerships with bus 
operators to substantially improve services and develop more environmentally sustainable 
travel behaviours. The National Bus Strategy considers that franchising and (in particular) 
enhanced bus partnerships could increase the quality and attractiveness of bus services. 
Integrated services and multi-modal tickets are particularly emphasised, together with 
increases in bus priority measures and high-quality information for passengers. Amidst this, 
the role of innovation is largely seen as applying greener vehicle technologies to buses. There 
is passing reference to demand responsive services, but these are presented as of marginal 
relevance “in lower-density, often rural areas” and to “improve evening and Sunday services 
in places which currently lack them, integrated with conventional buses during the day” (DfT 
2021a: 13).  
This paper reports and analyses some initial results from a scoping study on a much more 
innovative approach than anything envisaged in the National Bus Strategy. This is one that 
seeks a bus business model to match 21st century travel demands – not trying to get modern 
travel practices to conform to an early 20th century bus operating model. This raised the 
question that, rather than institutional reforms to the existing bus business model, might a 
different business model for buses be the key to transforming local public transport services? 
This study is of how one unitary local authority, Milton Keynes, has used an innovative 
approach focusing on demand responsive transport (DRT) that seeks to simultaneously 
achieve cost efficiency and transform service quality to make bus travel a viable option for a 
large segment of society. Could such an innovative approach represent an important 
contribution to enhancing the role of bus services in our post pandemic recovery?  
Demand Responsive Transport  
For many years it has been argued that Demand Responsive Transport (DRT) is well suited 
to modern patterns of travel demand. DRT is ‘an intermediate form of public transport, 
somewhere between a regular service route that uses small low floor buses and variably 
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as a concept is theoretically appealing because it offers passengers an almost taxi-level 
service for the price of a bus ticket, whilst costing less to operate than a conventional (larger) 
bus. In practice however, (periodic resurgences aside), DRT has remained relatively niche as 
a public transport mode due to three particular barriers (Cervero, 1997; Enoch et al, 2004; 
Mulley, Nelson et al, 2012), namely technological, institutional and economic. 
 
Recent experiences, however, seem to suggest that the technological barriers have largely 
been solved, whilst in many jurisdictions around the world the institutional hurdles have largely 
been sidestepped (albeit not actually removed in many cases) though it does seem that more 
information is needed on how services achieve financial viability (Perrera et al, 2020). 
Consequently, DRT looks set to move into the mainstream, with many new schemes proposed 
or launched in England (e.g. Ebbsfleet, West Yorkshire, Hertfordshire, Cambridgeshire, North 
Lincolnshire), Scotland (e.g. Aberdeenshire, Moray, South East Scotland), and Wales (e.g. 
Cardiff, Newport and North Wales) (various editions of Local Transport Today 2020-2021). 
Internationally, there have been numerous DRT trials and schemes. Bridj, Lyftline, UberPOOL 
and Via have operated in the United States, and in Europe examples include Abel in 
Amsterdam, Kutsuplus in Helsinki, Padam in Paris, and Radiobus di Quartiere in Milan among 
others (Alonso-Gonzalez et al 2018, Veeneman and Mulley 2018, Pettersson 2019). 
 
This issue of financial viability stems from the fact that small vehicles generally struggle to 
generate sufficient revenue from the low numbers of passengers often paying relatively low 
fares to cover the high costs of provision (particularly the driver costs). In addressing this, 
Enoch (2021) noted how surviving DRT operations have looked to raise revenue and/or cut 
costs. Thus, commercially driven ‘jitney-style’ schemes on high-demand corridors aim to boost 
revenues by maximising ridership, often not even setting off until they are full, whilst airport 
shuttle operators charge fares between the public transport and airport taxi rates, so reflecting 
the intermediate quality of the service. Other mechanisms are to generate ancillary revenue 
streams (e.g. advertising), rely on local authority subsidies, or attract new monies from 
alternative external sources like employers. Cost cutting methods have included service 
rationalisation through reducing service levels (frequencies, switching from door-to-door to 
pickup and drop points). Another cost cutting approach has been the use of brokerage 
schemes to share access to vehicles between community transport, social services, 
education, public transport operators and voluntary groups, Finally, the back-office system is 
a major part of a DRT service, so technological solutions to minimise the staff needed to 
answer telephones, or shared service centres can address this.  
 
Haglund et al (2019) stated that operators need to better understand the role of “operating 
zones, hours, and pricing schemes for static versus on-demand mobility services”, as well as 
the “interdependencies between service demand, fare subsidizing, fleet utilization, operating 
revenue, service availability and pricing schemes” (pp.11). Meanwhile, Sharmeen et al (2020) 
applied a business model methodology and emphasised the importance of public sector 
operations becoming more client oriented; more focused on the need for value creation and 
eventually revenue generation, with public sector operators becoming less a provider and 
more of a facilitator. Similarly, Calvert et al (2019) stated new models of partnership working 
to be critical, but that there were often signficant barriers to making this happen. Finally, Teal 
and Becker (2012) reported that “the public transport agencies in Denver and Dallas have 
adopted a strategy of carefully targeting customer-friendly flexible services to specific market 
segments while maintaining strict control of capacity. They have also competitively contracted 
these services to private operators—thereby keeping production costs at a low level— which 
would have been institutionally difficult if the services had been fixed route in nature” (pp64).  
 
The targeting of DRT services raises the issue of how they affect the public transport system 
as a whole. Sharmeen et al (2020) notes: "One of the major motivations to move towards FPT 
(DRT) systems is to address the gaps in both service delivery and market share, e.g. in solving 
the low-demand fixed transit line issue or offering last mile solutions. However, it is yet 
unknown how the advent of a new distribution channel (i.e. the platform provider) would affect 
the traditional public transit supply chains? How would the stakes and revenues be re-
arranged? General conjecture is that the public transport providers would be at the losing end 
of the bargain and end users would have to pay up – to what extent are these true". 
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To date, the reality in many areas is that establishing a scalable, sustainable business model 
for DRT remains elusive (Petterssen 2020, Sharmeen et al 2020), as is testified by recent 
failed schemes such as Charriot, Slide, Kutsuplus, Breng Flex, PickMeUp and Bridj.  
 
The Milton Keynes DRT service is one that addresses many of the issues summarised above. 
The arrival of technology-based cab operators, such as Uber Lyft and Ola, with their App-
based, automated algorithm booking systems has been exploited through a partnership with 
such a company to deliver a public transport service to address transport policy requirements. 
This is an important case of an enhanced bus partnership, but one that is very different to that 
envisaged in the conventional service constrained National Bus Strategy.  
Methodology 
This scoping study is in response to the opportunity provided by the rapid implementation in 
Milton Keynes of a comprehensive DRT network intended to substantially improve the quality 
and coverage of all public transport services in the area. Although it is important to gather and 
analyse quantitative operational and financial data, the focus of this study is on gathering 
detailed in-depth qualitative information on the factors leading to the schemes design and 
performance. 
As well as documenting factors leading to the design, performance and transferability of this 
particular DRT programme, this research is intended to help identify what theoretical 
frameworks can help provide an understanding of the processes and relationships involved. 
For example, in an innovative context, the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) could be used 
(Sharmeen and Meurs 2019) together with the related Strategic Niche Management theory to 
identify how long-term pressures from the Socio Technical Landscape lead to the need for 
innovation in public transport systems (Geels 2018:90). Niche innovations in DRT would be 
explored to develop understanding, but these would then have to move from experimental 
trials to establish a viable place within the public transport regime. That has been the core 
problem for DRT and is what the Milton Keynes programme is seeking to achieve. 
The quantitative and qualitative date gathered in this study should therefore be able to be 
analysed using a range of theoretical perspectives to identify the sorts of understanding that 
each can provide.   
This has led to a mix methods approach for the scoping study. Operational and monitoring 
quantitative data are gathered by the operator, Via, and Milton Keynes Council. These will be 
drawn upon, together with this project’s qualitative in-depth interviews of key actors and 
informants involved in the DRT systems design, development and implementation. Key 
informant interviews will later be undertaken to obtain information on user perspectives, 
including the changes that DRT produces in the practices, behaviours and understandings 
needed. 
 
Five in-depth interviews took place in May 2021 with people in Milton Keynes Council who 
developed the DRT service, with the operator Via, who successfully tendered to run the 
service, and with others who played a part in developing Milton Keynes public transport vision 
(which also includes some of the authors of this paper). The interviews were conducted online, 
using MS Teams, under protocols established by the Open University Research Ethics 
Committee. The following text incorporates the results of these interviews, together with 





POTTER, ENOCH, VALDEZ and COOK: DRT 
development in Milton Keynes 
 
This paper is produced and circulated privately and its inclusion  
in the conference does not constitute publication.  5 
DRT in Milton Keynes  
DRT featured early in the development of Milton 
Keynes when a ‘Dial-a-Bus' operated between 1975-
78, serving the scattered developing estates in the 
Woughton area (Bendixon and Platt 1992 :159-60). 
This was popular but proved too expensive to continue; 
it shifted to a semi-scheduled and then a conventional 
minibus service. Post bus deregulation in 1986, the 
Development Corporation and Milton Keynes Council 
were required to leave bus service development to the 
private sector (ibid). As the population of Milton Keynes 
grew, bus services did expand, but Milton Keynes 
dispersed car-oriented urban design meant that service 
levels remained poor for the emerging city of 250,000 
people. Broadly a pattern of services developed that 
was fairly typical of medium sized British provincial cities, with a limited commercial bus 
network run by a dominant operator (in Milton Keynes it is Arriva), with smaller local companies 
tendering for council supported services. About 85% of bus trips are on the commercial 
services and 15% on the supported services. The urban supported services typically ran at an 
hourly frequency, with rural services often two-hourly. By 2019 Milton Keynes had 10 
commercial bus routes and 11 routes of supported services, plus a number of other inter-town 
services that ran into Milton Keynes (including Stagecoach’s longer distance Oxford-
Cambridge X5).  
 
Since 2000, Milton Keynes Council has played a very active role in transport innovation 
(including EV charging infrastructure, a commercial eBus, autonomous pod trials, autonomous 
vehicle deliveries and city bike and eScooter schemes). They established a management 
structure within the Council that supports such initiatives with a specialist transport innovation 
function separate from transport planning and a close integration of its transport functions. For 
many years, recognising the inadequacy of its supported services, Milton Keynes Council has 
been looking for ways to sustainably introduce a DRT system. They wished to avoid the short-
term funded project model that had seen so many DRT schemes fold when the project funds 
ended. As such they sought a partnership with providers who were establishing technology-
led cab and DRT systems that could potentially be run in Milton Keynes without depending on 
a new ongoing subsidy and could be funded from established sources.  Discussions opened 
with Simply Connect and Arriva Click, but neither provided a cost-effective basis for the sort 
of service desired. 
When Via (then called Via Van) expressed 
interest in establishing a commercial DRT 
service in Milton Keynes, the Council recognised 
there was the opportunity to explore DRT 
concepts with them. Via’s own commercial DRT 
service became established in 2017-18, offering 
a fare midway between that of a cab and the bus 
for its on-demand, app-booked shared van 
service. It competed with both the bus and cabs, 
offering shared trips between local 
neighbourhood pickup and dropping off points. In 
2018 Milton Keynes Council and Via ran a trial 
project to explore how the Via service could be 
integrated with concessionary fares. This was part of developing knowledge and 
understanding of how a commercial DRT model could be adapted to fulfil the requirements of 
a public transport system. A commercial DRT service can focus on a particular market 
segment to the exclusion of others. By way of contrast, anything provided or supported by a 
local authority needs to be an inclusive form of public transport, being able to accommodate 
(as conventional buses do) wheelchair users and accept a range of ticketing types such as for 
concessionary fares for seniors and for students. The concept emerged of not just treating the 
supported services in isolation, but to use an innovative approach that would also support 
Fig 1: The 1975 Milton Keynes 
Dial-a-Bus 
Fig 2: A Via Van in commercial service 
in Milton Keynes in 2019 
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conventional commercial bus operations and produce an overall system that enhanced 
greener transport options as a whole.  
A second, and crucial, point was that the costs of supported services were rising for what was 
an extremely basic set of both urban and rural bus routes operated by a mix of small local 
operators. The supported services cost £2.8m per annum and these costs were rising 
substantially for relet contracts. Even before the 2020-21 Covid-19 pandemic hit, which 
drastically cut bus use leading to emergency funding, it was clear that to maintain supported 
services through conventional scheduled bus services was going to cost substantially more in 
coming years – while Council budgets were set to be increasingly squeezed. Initial modelling 
suggested that if a partner operator could provide booking and back office services, then DRT 
could significantly reduce the cost of the supported services while offering a better and more 
comprehensive service to users. With DRT largely seen as a niche rural areas measure, it was 
an innovative idea that it could be cost-effective for more lightly used urban services.  
Milton Keynes Council were also progressing the electrification of public transport, having 
been part of the Arup/Arriva eBus project that trialled inductive charged buses in 2013-18 on 
a commercial route to prove their technical and economic viability (Miles and Potter 2014). 
They had secured further funding from the Department of Transport to procure more eBuses, 
but the operator was unwilling to take part in providing further electrified services. With DfT 
approval, the Council repurposed the eBus monies to provide a useful capital injection for the 
conversion of the supported bus services to DRT. Thus the Milton Keynes scheme had both 
start-up funding to support initial capital costs and ongoing funding by tapping into the 
established supported services budget. 
The DRT Service in practice: MK Connect 
Just as the implementation plans were being progressed, aiming at replacing Council 
supported services with DRT in 2020, the Covid pandemic hit. Despite enhanced support 
being available, as bus patronage collapsed one supported service operator withdrew. At very 
short notice, in October 2020, an initial DRT operation was introduced to the area previously 
served by the withdrawn scheduled service. This was run by Via and, conveniently, acted as 
a real life trial ahead of the replacement of 11 conventional Council supported services from 
April 2021. As is a legal requirement, the contract was the subject of a competitive tender, 
which Via won. 
The Via contract is for an initial 3 years with reviews which allows the contract to be extended 
for a 4th and 5th year. It is a fixed price contract which replaces all but two conventional low-
cost subsidised services. The previous cost of all contracted services in 2020-21 was £2.8m. 
For the following year, 2021-22, the total cost for MK Connect and the other two low cost 
contracted services is £1.9m. Had all the scheduled contracted bus services been renewed 
the costs were projected to be well above the 2020-21 level, even without the pandemic effect. 
A realistic comparison would be that the Milton Keynes DRT services were coming in at 
something like 60% of the cost of the scheduled services they replaced - possibly even less.  
The form of contract for a DRT service compared to a contracted scheduled service involves 
important differences. A key issue about local authority contracts for DRT concerns what 
happens if demand rises requiring more vehicles and drivers to operate the service. The Milton 
Keynes Connect contract includes stringent KPIs (e.g. 30 minutes maximum time between 
booking and pickup for urban areas, 60 minutes for rural; 95% of journeys pick up within 10 
minutes of booked time, 95% of journeys having a pickup within 400 metres of booking point 
etc.). The operator cannot reduce the quality of service if more vehicles and drivers are needed 
– they are contractually obliged to meet the KPIs. The contractual mechanism in Milton Keynes 
that addresses this situation is that Via retain the fare revenues. Thus, if demand rises, their 
income will also rise and this would provide the funds for more vehicles and drivers to be 
added. Indeed, this has already happened. The initial fleet was 13 electric and 5 wheelchair 
accessible diesel vehicles. This was to match the pandemic lockdown demand when the 
service was launch in April 2021. However, growth in passengers (and passenger income) 
has been such that by late May 2021, Via had added another two diesel vehicles to the MK 
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The service area for MK 
Connect is the whole of the 
unitary Borough of Milton 
Keynes, serving both its urban 
and rural areas (covering about 
300 sq. km). The service is 
available Monday-Saturday 
6am-11pm and 9am-6pm on 
Sundays, across the entire 
Borough. This is a 
considerable improvement on 
the service times of the 
conventional buses the DRT 
replaces, which operated at an 
hourly frequency in urban 
areas (two-hourly in rural 
areas), with little by way of an 
evening service and no Sunday 
service at all. The service is 
therefore far more inclusive, 
making possible trips that 
simply could not be made using 
the former scheduled routes, 
and operating at times and on 
days when previously there 
was no bus service at all.  
 
The service is booked by users logging their pickup and drop off addresses through a smart 
phone app, web portal or (for senior concessionary pass holders only) phoning the contact 
centre. Electronic booking points at key bus stops to request a trip are also being installed. 
Payment is cashless via the app to a registered credit/debit card. The user is directed to a 
pickup point (which may be a bus stop or another nearby location) and told when the pickup 
will be. For urban areas the pickup is normally about 10 minutes after the booking is made at 
a point 150-250 metres from where they are, but this is longer for rural areas. The app allows 
the user to track their vehicle in real time, to know exactly when it will arrive.   
 
Should the request be for a trip that matches a scheduled commercial bus route, the customer 
is directed to use this. The booking system algorithms can identify if a trip request is on a 
scheduled bus route and will direct the customer to use that; it will accept a trip request when 
that route is not operating (e.g. evenings or Sundays) and will also accept a booking if using 
the scheduled bus would require and excessive journey time (over an hour). Individuals can 
register special needs that inhibit them from using conventional buses; if this is done the 
booking system will allow any trip to be accepted. 
 
That MK Connect does not compete with the scheduled services is a key part of the service 
design. Firstly, this is because it is illegal for council supported services to compete with 
commercial services; also, the strategic vision is that the introduction of MK Connect will 
strengthen public transport services as a whole. The expectation is that the DRT service will 
enhance the entire public transport system, which will eventually result in the sort of growth in 
use desired to achieve inclusive mobility and sustainable transport aims.   
There is a flat fare for trips on MK Connect, which is £3.50 during peak hours (7am-9am, 
4.30pm-6.30pm), £2.50 at all other times, £1 for All in 1 MK (youth and student) cardholders 
and free for Older Person’s and Disabled Person’s bus pass holders after 9.30am on 
weekdays and all day on weekends. These are comparable to existing bus fares, but there are 
presently no discounted weekly or monthly tickets. The bus fare levels and the various 
concessionary passes are crucial to MK Connect being a real public transport service. This 
has led to some concerns about the service being swamped by concessionary fare users, 
producing a slump in revenue, which would jeopardise the economic model (as outlined above, 
Via keep fares revenues and these are an important part of the viability of the service contract). 
Fig 3: The MK Connect service area 
Source: Via MK Connect website: ridewithvia.com/mk-connect/ 
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Limiting an individual’s number of concessionary pass trips was considered, but in discussions 
with the Department for Transport it was established this would not be legal, so no limits have 
been imposed. In the first two months of service, although the use of free and discounted 
passes has been higher than for conventional buses, the level is manageable and does not 
threaten the economic viability of the service. Around 50% of trips are full fare, 25% at the 
youth concessionary rate of £1 and 25% senior free passes.  
The services are operated with 8-seater 
vehicles under a Private Hire Vehicle Licence. 
Passengers can register special needs; those 
with a wheelchair or disability will always be 
matched with a fully accessible vehicle, and the 
service is accessible to passengers with vision 
and hearing impairments, as well as those with 
other additional needs. Closer pick-up and 
drop-off points are made for those who register 
substantial mobility limitations, and (as noted 
above) if the impairment inhibits them using 
scheduled services, their trip requests will be 
accepted even along an existing bus route.   
 
The 8-seater vehicles have a large boot that 
can take shopping bags, luggage, child buggies, smaller mobility scooters and folding bicycles.  
 
In the first month, 25,000 new accounts were registered and MK Connect’s operations involved 
5,000 rides, with 65% of trips being in the electric vehicles. 100 trips were made in wheelchair 
accessible vehicles. The average wait time was 15.7 minutes from booking and the average 
walking distance to join the bus was 150 metres. In rural areas the walking distance was 
higher, but even so, 97% of all trips were within a 400 metre walking distance of the rider’s 
starting point.  
 
By the end of the second month (to 31st May), over 20,000 rides had been made with demand 
at that point was averaging 600 passengers a day (a rate of 18,000 trips a month. Demand 
was growing by about 20% a week, albeit from a low base as post lockdown social and 
economic activity resumed.   
 
Discussion  
The scoping study is ongoing and this paper is essentially work in progress. We are conducting 
the research in parallel with the service itself becoming established. Further interviews will 
take place with key informants representing DRT users in Milton Keynes. As the full service 
only started in April 2021, these interviews will not take place until this autumn, to allow the 
service to be 6 months in operation. Users will by then have been able to adjust to the new 
way of accessing and using this public transport system and be in a position to provide 
informed responses. We will also be investigating how understandings of MK Connect have 
evolved and how practices have developed to use it.   
As noted in the Introduction to this paper, a number of studies had identified three sets of 
issues that needed to be addressed before DRT could become a viable service. These were 
the technology of providing DRT; how DRT relates to the regulation of bus services (which 
assumes conventional scheduled services) and the economic model of DRT services. 
The technology has largely emerged from tech-based IT companies working for or within the 
taxi and private hire sector, and this can now be considered as established and reliable. For 
the Milton Keynes contract, a crucial element was that, under the annual fixed fee, the operator 
provides the entire service, including the booking and scheduling software and its operations. 
The contract also specifies that the software should be adapted to include key features for MK 
Connect to operate as part of the city’s public transport system. This has included algorithms 
to direct requests to scheduled services when appropriate and allow users with special needs 
to log these and for the special needs to customise trip bookings (e.g. a so registered user to 
be allocated to a wheelchair accessible vehicle). The contract design is something that should 
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be of particular interest to other local authorities. Taking and modifying an existing commercial 
online system was crucial to making MK Connect economically viable. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, in Milton Keynes the modified design has had some initial glitches (some of which 
caused a certain amount of user frustration) but these are now being corrected. 
The specifying of KPIs (and requiring their reporting to the Council) is also a crucial feature. 
This ensures that minimum standards are achieved and that the operator cannot reduce 
service quality in order to cut costs. The revenue retention mechanism to fund service 
expansion is also an important contract feature and is something that our research team intend 
to monitor to see if this fully succeeds. The proportion of trips made using discounted and free 
passes will also play a role in this. For conventional buses, which have ample off-peak 
capacity, free and discounted passes are not a particular issue. For DRT how such passes 
are used is far more important. If and how the use of these might be limited within a DRT 
service could be important (and something that would need some regulatory adjustments).  
A further ticketing issue could have important transport policy implications. The MK Connect 
fare system only offers single trips and no day, week or monthly tickets are available. This is 
in contrast to the existing bus service fare structure in the Milton Keynes area (and elsewhere 
in the country) where such tickets are available, considerably reducing the cost to regular and 
frequent users. This situation is intended as a pragmatic interim arrangement which stems 
from the practicalities of setting up a radically new service. 
The interviewees from Milton Keynes Council are aware that this ticketing structure means 
that, while MK Connect offers comparable priced tickets for single or day return trips, for 
frequent users (e.g. commuters), the MK Connect DRT is considerably more expensive than 
the conventional bus services it replaces. This issue is recognised by the Council who intend 
to introduce weekly/monthly tickets, but these may be restricted in some way in order to not 
substantially cut fares income. This difficulty in providing weekly/monthly tickets stem from the 
fact that the retention of fares income by the operator is an essential part of the MK Connect 
business model; discounted weekly and monthly passes would reduce net income. There is a 
dilemma here – to have an impact on car use and for people to make a lifestyle choice to rely 
on public transport services will probably need some form of loyalty reward – traditionally 
provided through discounted weekly and monthly passes. But, in the short term, the MK 
Connect business model depends on a high proportion of full fare uses providing a healthy 
revenue stream. 
The above discussion has already touched upon implications for regulatory structures and 
systems. The issue of how DRT relates to bus service regulation is one that produced 
contrasting responses from our interviewees. Some felt that this was less of a concern than in 
the past, while others considered that it remained deeply problematic.  
Government is increasingly aware that regulations need to reflect innovative public transport 
models, although little relating to this appears in the 2021 National Bus Strategy. However, 
there is an additional regulatory issue that, even if bus regulations are beginning to adapt to 
recognise DRT, they can exclude DRT schemes that operate outside of the Public Service 
Vehicle licence (PSV) structure. This is, perhaps, behind our contrasting views on regulatory 
challenges as the Milton Keynes DRT service has been implemented under Private Hire 
Vehicle (PHV) regulations. PHV regulations are intended for pre-booked cab services and, 
although they do permit shared bookings, are not envisaged as being a system under which 
public transport services operate.    
Using PHV licensed vehicles does result in a real issue of the MK Connect service being 
ineligible for the Bus Service Operators’ Grant (BSOG). It would also appear to be outside the 
scope of the emerging system set out the 2021 National Bus Strategy. The guidance to date 
indicates that DRT operating with PHV licence will not qualify as part of a Bus Service 
Improvement Plan (BSIP). This needs some clarification, but if so, is a major barrier as BSIP 
will be the major government funding stream for bus services (£3b per annum).  A PHV DRT 
scheme may also fail to qualify for the new bus partnership funding if that also is restricted to 
PSV licensed services. Regulation has yet to reflect changes in public transport service 
designs, technology and operations. Whereas there used to be a clear distinction between bus 
services (PSV) and Private Hire Vehicle cab operations, DRT can take place under either 
licensing regime. A way to allow appropriate PHV DRT services to qualify is needed. This is 
an aspect that will be explored further in this study. One possibility would be to accept PHV 
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operations that are part of a local authority franchise/contract as being within an approved Bus 
Partnership). The additional funding that would unlock could then help ease the finance 
dilemma around discounted tickets for regular users. 
These regulatory aspect lead into issues around the economic model for DRT, and this is 
where the greatest challenges remain. Introducing a fully commercially-viable DRT is difficult 
and it looks like the most viable way forward is going to be through partnerships between the 
new IT service companies, operators and local authorities (hence the importance of such 
partnerships receiving policy recognition). Where DRT can build upon an existing service base 
seems the most viable transition path as there is an existing income stream. In Milton Keynes 
this is for subsidised services. Another of the interviewees, having set up the Milton Keynes 
DRT, moved to a very different context, that of the West Midlands. Here there were different 
opportunities and constraints, but there were a number of subsidised transport services, one 
of which was suited to form the basis of a DRT system. This was the Ring and Ride specialist 
service for people with disabilities. Modernising this to form the basis of a wider DRT service 
is now being explored. 
Marginally viable commercial services could also be the basis for a DRT partnerships with 
operators. Indeed, with the post-pandemic dip in bus patronage, there may be many local 
authorities in discussions with commercial operators about how to keep services running. 
One crucial lesson is to avoid ‘project’ funding. That may work for a controlled trial to develop 
systems and build knowledge, understanding and confidence, but is not the basis for rolling 
out a permanent service. Projects rarely manage to ‘kick start’ a viable new service. One 
lesson from Milton Keynes is to introduce DRT to enhance an existing funded service. It can 
then get established and develop to address wider policy goals. A big mistake of many DRT 
projects has been to try to build a new user base around policy ideals that would take many 
years to develop. Such DRT services rarely managed to survive. Milton Keynes has built on 
council supported services, but other LA subsidised services could form the basis. The way in 
which Arriva Click are developing DRT represents another pathway - where using DRT to 
reconfigure commercial services enhances the profitability of that operator’s system as a 
whole.  
These various pathways suggest an eventual major change in the local public transport 
regime. An integration of DRT into local bus services can yield a considerable improvement in 
the quality provided, but does require users to learn and understand how it works. With its use 
of a real time booking app, MK Connect has many of the features of the more integrated MaaS 
vision frequently espoused as representing the public transport future. In this respect it can be 
seen as a practices/behaviours stepping stone towards that vision. Hence, monitoring the 
substantial change Milton Keynes users are facing in how local bus services are provided is 
of particular research interest. This situation is likely to be repeated around different 
implementation models in many other places, and so the lessons from Milton Keynes could 
have considerable value for DRT schemes elsewhere.  
MK Connect: Key points for further investigation 
To date this scoping paper has identified a number of issues raised by the MK Connect case 
study.  Feedback on these issues, and other observations, are particularly welcome.   
There are a group of issues around the design of the DRT system itself, which include:  
• In terms of service design, the design of MK Connect has addressed most of the 
weaknesses of previous DRT attempts.   
• It is a franchise model (like all supported services) as is advocated by the Bus 
Strategy.  
• The franchise contract is structured around DRT metrics – as is specified in the KPIs  
• It has established financial support and an established passenger base.  
• The contract provides the financial flexibility required of a DRT service. This is 
significant and contains transferability lessons.  
• The DRT franchise using the PHV system, bends the rules and in itself is viable, but 
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different way (e.g. PHV operations that are part of a local authority franchise being 
accepted within an approved Bus Partnership).   
   
A second set of issues are about how DRT relates to the broader transport system.  
• The MK Connect DRT franchise forms part of an overall partnership approach with 
commercial scheduled services – this is distinctive. This is also advocated in the 
Bus Strategy (but in a narrower manner). The approach in Milton Keynes shows an 
approach that is far more transformative.   
• It’s 21st century service design, behaviours and practices – and as such could be a 
bridge to a MaaS-type offering.   
A number of strategic policy implications have been identified.  
• All bus service designs suit some users better than others. The conventional 
scheduled services that MK Connect replaced excluded a substantial number of trip 
types and people. Conventional bus services increasingly fail to provide for 21st 
century patterns of travel demand. The MK Connect service addresses this problem 
and the increased mobility options it provides can be expected to produce substantial 
social and economic benefits.   
• But the form of this DRT model, while producing a high quality and economically viable 
service, might not address some trip types of key policy concern – in particular 
commuters and other regular users. Milton Keynes Council are aware of this issue 
and intend to address it.  
• Assigning DRT to just a ‘last mile’ function limits its application to propping up an 
increasing failed bus service model. DRT can complement line buses in a far more 
sophisticated way to produce an overall network far more appropriate to 21st century 
patterns of travel. 
Overall, MK Connect is an important approach to implementing DRT, which seeks to 
simultaneously achieve cost efficiency and transform service quality to make bus travel a 
viable option for a large segment of society. We will continue this study, which the authors 
believe represents an important contribution to enhancing the role of bus services in Britain’s 
post pandemic recovery. 
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